Abstract-The maximum entropy noise under a lag autocorrelation constraint is known by Burg's theorem to be the th order Gauss-Markov process satisfying these constraints. The question is, what is the worst additive noise for a communication channel given these constraints? Is it the maximum entropy noise?
Substituting (49), (48), and (50) into (47), and using the fact that D is self-orthogonal, we obtain p02 l=1 right-hand side of (44) n + (p 0 1) (0p) n and the assertion of the lemma follows.
I. INTRODUCTION
This correspondence treats a simple problem. What is the noisiest noise under certain constraints? There are two possible contexts in which we might ask this question. One is, what is the noisiest random process satisfying, for example, a lag covariance constraint, [Z i Z i+k ] = R k , k = 0; ... p. Thus, we ask for the maximum entropy rate for such a process. It is well known from Burg's work [1] , [2] that the maximum-entropy noise process under p lag constraints is the pth-order Gauss-Markov process satisfying these constraints, i.e., it is the process that has minimal dependency on the past given the covariance constraints.
Another context in which we might ask this question is for an additive noise channel Y = X + Z , where the noise Z has covariance constraints R 0 ; ...; R p and the signal X has a power constraint P .
What is the worst possible additive noise subject to these constraints? We expect the answer to be the maximum-entropy noise, as in the first problem. Indeed, we find this is the case, but only when the signal power is high enough to fill the spectrum of the maximum-entropy noise (yielding a white noise sum).
Consider the channel where X k is the transmitted signal and Z k is the additive noise. Transmission over additive Gaussian noise channels has been well studied over the past several decades [1] . The capacity is achieved by using Gaussian signaling and water-filling over the noise spectrum [1] . The question of communication over partially known additive noise channels is addressed in [3] - [5] , where the class of memoryless noise processes with average power constraint N0 is considered. A game-theoretic problem [3] - [5] is formulated with a mutual information payoff, where the sender maximizes mutual information, and the noise minimizes it, subject to average power constraints. It has been shown that an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian signaling scheme and an i.i.d. Gaussian noise distribution are robust, in that any deviation of either the signal or noise distribution reduces or increases (respectively) the mutual information. Hence, the solution to this gametheoretic problem yields a rate of 1 2 log(1 + P=N 0 ), where P and N 0 are the signal and noise power constraints, respectively. An excellent survey for communication under channel uncertainties is given in [6] . In [7] , [8] , a game-theoretic problem with Gaussian inputs transmitted over a jamming channel (having an average power constraint) is studied under a mean-squared error payoff function (for estimation/detection). The problem of worst power-constrained noise when the inputs are limited to the binary alphabet is considered in [9] .
The more general M -dimensional problem with average noise power constraint is considered in [10] , where it is shown that even when the channel is not restricted to be memoryless, the white Gaussian codebook and white Gaussian noise constitute a unique saddle point. In [11] , [12] (and references therein) it was shown that a Gaussian codebook and minimum Euclidean distance decoding achieves rate 1 2 log(1 + P=N 0 ) under an average power constraint.
Therefore, for average signal and noise power constraints the maximum-entropy noise is the worst additive noise for communication. We ask whether this principle is true in more generality.
Suppose the noise is not memoryless and we have covariance constraints. If the signal is Gaussian with covariance K x and the noise is Gaussian with covariance Kz, the mutual information I(X; X + Z)
is given by
It is well known that the mutual information is maximized by choosing a signal covariance K x that waterfills K z [1] . The question we ask is about communication over partially known additive noise channels subject to covariance constraints. We first formulate the game-theoretic problem with mutual information as the payoff. The signal maximizes the mutual information and the noise minimizes it by choosing distributions subject to covariance constraints. Note that the problem considered is similar in formulation to the compound channel problem [13] , and, therefore, is more benign than the allowed noise in arbitrarily varying channels [6] , [12] . In [14] , [15] the problem where a memoryless interference which is statistically dependent on the input was considered. In this correspondence, the additive noise is independent of the input but need not be memoryless. We first show that Gaussian signaling and Gaussian noise constitute a saddle point to the mutual information game with covariance constraints. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to the solution of a determinant game with payoff 1 2 log( jK +K j jK j ). To solve this problem, one chooses the signal covariance K x and noise covariance K z to maximize and minimize (respectively) the payoff 1 2 log( jK +K j jK j ) subject to covariance constraints. Throughout this correspondence, we impose an expected power constraint on the signal,
We will also assume that the noise covariance Kz lies in a given convex set K z , but the noise distribution is otherwise unspecified. For example, the set K z of covariances K z satisfying correlation constraints R0; . . . ; Rp is a convex set. Also, for some of the results in the correspondence, we assume K z > 0, for all K z 2 K z , i.e., the noise processes are not degenerate.
We study the properties of the saddle points to the payoff function 1 2 log( jK +K j jK j ). We show that the signaling covariance matrix K x is unique and water-fills a set of worst noise covariance matrices. The set of worst noise covariance matrices is shown to be convex and hence the signaling scheme is protected against any mixture of noise covariances.
Therefore, choosing a Gaussian signaling scheme with covariance K 3 x which water-fills the class of worst covariance matrices will achieve the minimax mutual information. This establishes a single optimal strategy for the sender (Gaussian with a certain covariance matrix designed to water-fill the minimax noise) and a convex set of possible noise covariances, all of which look the same "below the water line." Next, we re-examine the question of whether the maximum entropy noise is the worst additive noise when we have a banded matrix constraint specified up to a certain covariance lag on the noise covariance matrix. In this case, we show that if we have sufficient input power, the maximum entropy noise is also the worst additive noise in the sense that it achieves the saddle point and minimizes the mutual information.
We put forth the game-theoretic problem in Section II, establish the existence of a saddle point and also study its properties. We consider the banded noise covariance constraint in Section III. In Section IV, we show this minimax rate is actually achievable using a random Gaussian codebook and Mahalanobis distance decoding.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The general problem is that of finding the maximum reliable communication rate over all noise distributions subject to covariance constraints. Throughout this section, we assume that the constraint sets K x and K z are closed, bounded, and convex. Note that we have implicitly associated with Kx and Kz the topology of n 2n symmetric matrices, i.e., that associated with M , where M = n(n + 1)=2. We need to show that there exists a codebook that is simultaneously good for all such noise distributions. We first guess that this problem can be solved by solving the minimax mutual information game. Later, in Section IV, we examine a random coding scheme and a decoding rule that achieves this rate. Hence, the signal designer maximizes the mutual information and the noise (nature) minimizes it, and this is the minimax communication capacity.
Therefore, we consider minimax problem 
for all pX 2 X; pZ 2 Z, where X X X 3(n) and Z Z Z 3(n) are distributed according to measures p 3 X and p 3 Z , respectively, then (p 3 X ; p 3 Z ) is defined as a saddle point for I(X X X (n) ; X X X (n) + Z Z Z (n) ), and I(X X X 3(n) ; X X X 3(n) + Z Z Z 3(n) ) is called the value of the game. To show the existence of such a saddle point, we examine some properties of the mutual information under input and noise constraints. We first show that there exist saddle points which have Gaussian probability measures pX and pZ. 
where f Z Z Z (1) denotes the probability density function of Z Z Z G , and Z Z Z [1] and Z Z Z [1] denote the expectations with respect to Z Z Z G and Z Z Z,
respectively.
The following result (Lemma II.2) has been proved by Ihara [17] based on a result by Pinsker [18] . The alternative proof given below shows the condition for which equality holds. In the proof, we assume the noise has a probability density function. respectively. We have 
The equality in ( Therefore, to achieve equality in (b) we need Z Z Z N(0; Kz) and,
Using Lemma II.2 we examine the properties of the original minimax problem. 
, is also in K x , by the convexity of Kx. Thus, X is convex. The same argument is true for the noise probability measure.
is concave in p X and convex in pZ [1] , and the constraint sets on the probability measures are closed, convex, and bounded. Hence, using the fundamental theorem of game theory [19] , we know that there exists a saddle point (p where the inequality follows from the fact that the Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy for a given covariance (see [1, Cha. 9] 
for any distribution on Z Z Z 3(n) , where Z Z Z (n) G N(0; K z ), and K z is the covariance matrix of Z Z Z 3(n) . Hence, we have shown that
Thus, p 3 X ; p 3 Z is also a saddle point. This also shows an interchangability property, i.e., if (p (1) X ; p (1) Z ) and (p (2) X ; p (2) Z ) are saddle points then (p (1) X ; p (2) Z ) and (p (2) X ; p It is well known from convex analysis [20] that the set of minimizing arguments for a convex function is a convex set. In the next result, we use this to show the set of worst noise distributions is a convex set. is a convex set. 
where X X X
z + (10 )p (2) z ; and V is the value of the game as defined in Theorem II.1.The above equation is due to the convexity of I(X X X (n) ; X X X (n)
) with p Z [1] . Thus, the inequality in (15) 
Using (18) and
we obtain,
which completes the proof for (b) in (17) . Therefore, equality is achieved in (17) iffZ Z Z 1 0CZ Z Z 2 has a full-rank Gaussian distribution. Now, this does not completely answer the question of whether all saddle points to this problem are Gaussian. The problem arises primarily because the mutual information is not necessarily a strictly convex function of p Z and, therefore, the noise saddle-point distribution p 3 Z need not be unique. However, using Theorem II.1, which shows the existence of Gaussian saddle points, and Proposition II.1 we believe that it is worthwhile to focus our attention on the Gaussian mutual information game defined as follows.
The Gaussian mutual information game is defined with payoff
where we have constrained X X X (n) and Z Z Z (n) to be Gaussian with co- x is already water-filling any convex combination of fKzg 2 K 3 z . Moreover, the noise cannot further reduce the mutual information by using any other distribution in Z 3 . In [22] , [23] , a problem with vector (parallel channels) inputs and outputs with power constraints on the signal and noise was considered. In our problem, the transmitter does not know the noise covariance matrix and cannot use this information to form parallel channels. Moreover, the constraints on the processes are more general than power constraints (or trace constraints on the covariance matrix).
Next we examine the properties of the function g(Kx; Kz). In particular, we show that w.p.
2;
w.p. (22) where = 10. Let Z Z Z 1 N(0; K Z ), Z Z Z 2 N(0; K Z ) (mutually independent and independent of X X X), and let us define jKx + Kzj jKzj (27) where Z Z Z G N(0; Kz) and Kz = Kz + Kz . Using (25)- (27) we have log jKx + Kz j jKz j + log jKx + Kz j jKz j log jK x + K z j jK z j
which gives the desired result. Note that if K x > 0, the inequality in (27) is strict, by Lemma II.2, implying strict convexity.
The following lemma [24] has an information-theoretic proof in [25] .
Lemma II.4:
If Kz > 0, the function log( jK +K j jK j ) is strictly con-
We now prove sufficient conditions under which the saddle point to the mutual information game is unique. 
and as K 3
x > 0, equality is achieved iff Z Z Z This result also helps us make observations on the set of noise saddlepoint distributions for the case when K 3
x is not strictly positive-definite. Here we use the notation of Proposition II.1 and (17). If rank (K x ) = <n, using the partition defined in (16), then we observe that KX X X > 0: Using Lemma II.5 on I(X X X 3 1 ;X X X 3 1 +Z Z Z 1 0 CZ Z Z 2) we see that for the noise saddle-point distribution, (Z Z Z 1 0 CZ Z Z 2 ) has to be Gaussian with a unique covariance. Therefore, we can observe that the saddle-point distributions are such that the Schur complement of the noise covariance matrix, projected onto the signal covariance eigendirections, is a constant. More precisely, the set of noise saddle-point distributions is convex and such that theZ Z Z 1 0 CZ Z Z 2 has a full-rank Gaussian distribution with a covariance [ 
which is constant over the set. We know [3] that for average signal and noise power, the pair (Kx = PI I I; K z = N 0 I I I) is a saddle point. The result in Lemma II.5 shows that the saddle point is unique [10] . In the next section, we find the worst additive noise for a banded covariance constraint.
III. BANDED COVARIANCE CONSTRAINT
In this section, we constrain the noise distribution to have a banded covariance matrix. Here we assume that we know the noise covariance lags up to the pth lag as given by
The noise is assumed to have zero mean. Now, as the transmitter knows only partial information about the noise spectrum, the question is what should be the input spectrum solving the mutual information game defined in (2) . In this section, we consider noise distributions Z = fp(z) We now show that the maximum-entropy extension K 33 z is the worst additive noise when we have to hold, we see that the power should be large enough so that we can "completely" water-fill the maximum-entropy extension. The power needed for this is bounded, as we now argue. For the maximum-entropy completion, the noise covariance matrix is Toepltiz [1] and, therefore, asymptotically the density of the eigenvalues on the real line tends to the power spectrum of the maximum entropy stochastic process [1] .
Hence, the condition for the power spectral density of the input process for "completely" water-filling the maximum-entropy process is that Thus, deviation by the noise player is strictly punished, and the maximum-entropy noise is seen to be strictly suboptimal for low power.
Note that when we have low signal power, the optimal K 3
x does not have full rank. In general (for a larger number of dimensions n), there could be a convex set of noise covariance matrices whose projections on the range space of K 3
x are identical but could be different in the null space of K 3
x (still satisfying the covariance constraints). Thus, the set of worst noise covariance matrices is convex and looks the same in the range space of K 3
x (or "below the water line").
IV. DECODING SCHEME It is difficult for the receiver to form a maximum-likelihood detection scheme for all noise distributions. Therefore, we propose using a simpler detection scheme based on a Gaussian metric and the second-order moments. However, as this is not the optimal metric, it falls into the category of mismatched decoding [11] , and it is not obvious that the rate 1 2 log jK +K j jK j is achievable using such a mismatched decoding scheme.
In this section, we show that the rate 1 2 log jK +K j jK j is achievable using a random Gaussian codebook and a Gaussian metric under some conditions on the noise process. In [11] , [23] , it was shown that 1 2 log(1 + P=N 0 ) is achievable using a Gaussian codebook and a minimum Euclidean distance decoding metric. This result was extended to the vector single-user channel where the transmitter knows the noise covariance matrix and hence can form parallel channels [11] , [23] . In our case, we do not assume that the transmitter knows the noise covariance but show that if the receiver knows K z , then the rate 1 2 log jK +K j jK j is achievable.
The coding game is played as follows. The transmitter knows the family K z but not the specific covariance K z 2 K z or the distribution.
The transmitter chooses a distribution p(x (n) ) and 2 nR i.i.d. codewords drawn according to p(x (n) ). The transmitter is also allowed to choose a random codebook, where the codebook is known to the receiver. The receiver is assumed to know Kz but not the noise distribution. The receiver chooses a given decoding rule based on the knowledge of the noise covariance and the transmitter codebook. The noise can choose any distribution f (z (n) ) satisfying the given covariance constraints K z 2 K z and some regularity conditions (C1 and C2 below) on the noise process. We find the highest achievable rate for which the probability of error averaged over the random codebooks goes to zero. 
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound, using = C n 0 and This result needs to be interpreted with caution, as it is proved that the average error probability, averaged over randomly chosen codebooks, goes to zero. This does not show that a single codebook will suffice for all noise distributions in K z . Randomization may protect against noise distributions which are designed for specific codebooks. Given 
where (a) follows from N(0; I) and (b) uses the matrix inversion lemma and the facts K x = C C CC C
